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Abstract
Over the last twenty years, developing countries have experienced the massive
shift of financing and the operation of infrastructure from the public to private
sector. The paper analyzes how the government agency should structure the investment promotion policy. I develop a sequential contracting model between the
government, investors and infrastructure providers and derive several properties of
the optimal policy. The policy leaves investors uncertain about the project type and
prescribes diﬀerent levels of government support, in the form of tax or price distortions. However, the optimal policy does not change the expectations of investors
about distribution of project returns. I characterize how the optimal policy depends on the revenue generation preferences of the government and the profitability
of infrastructure projects in the country.
Keywords: infrastructure financing, sequential mechanisms, investment promotion, information disclosure.
JEL Codes: D82, D86, G38, L51, O2.
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Introduction

Financing infrastructure projects presents one of the major challenges in developing countries. Starting in the beginning of the 1990s, growing budgetary pressures led governments
to transfer financing and the operation of infrastructure from the public to the private
sector.1 This change has not eliminated the need for government support. Rather, it
∗

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Email: karta@wharton.upenn.edu. I am grateful
to Jean-Jacques Laﬀont and Patrick Rey for encouragement and supervision. I thank Cécile Aubert,
Emmanuelle Auriol, Helmuth Bester, Bernard Caillaud, Bruno Jullien, Guido Friebel, David Martimort
and Jean Tirole for helpful comments and discussions.
1
The World Bank study on Private Participation in Infrastructure documents that during the 1990s
developing countries transferred to the private sector the operation of almost 2,500 infrastructure projects
with investment commitments of more than $750 billion.
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has changed the form. First, investment opportunities need to be promoted to outside
investors. Second, many socially valuable infrastructure projects cannot be implemented
on a purely commercial basis without government support. The objective of this paper
is to provide a theoretical framework to study the eﬀectiveness of investment promotion
policies.
Investment promotion policies of the government consist of designing rules for infrastructure project selection, award procedures, support and regulation. Typically, there
are two negotiation stages between the government, infrastructure project operators and
foreign investors (Sader 1999). At the first stage, the project operator (a local or foreign company with expertise in the field) approaches the government to reach an initial
agreement on project development. Once the operator has exclusive rights on project
development, it often invites other equity participants to build a consortium through a
shareholder agreement. In general, the purpose of the consortium is to carry out a specific
project. The consortium members then negotiate the terms of the project with the government. Successful negotiations result in a project or a concession contract with length
of up to 30 years.
At the second stage, after a project is approved by the government, the operator
must raise outside financing. According to the Foreign Investment Advisory Service2
(FIAS), 75% of project costs are covered by debt, and foreign investors participate in
80% of all projects. But foreign investors do not automatically participate in an arbitrary
privatization. FIAS estimates that the number of projects that are actually implemented is
only 20-30% of the potential projects which have been negotiated between the government
and the operators and which have obtained government approval. The question is how the
government should select and support operators to maximize the number of implemented
socially valuable projects.
The scope for active government policy in this paper comes from the fact that the
2

The Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) is a joint facility of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) that provides advisory assistance to governments in developing
countries to establish policy framework to attract foreign investors.
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profitability of some of infrastructure projects is below financing costs. The pool consists
of two types of projects. Both types are socially desirable. High return projects are
commercially viable. Low return projects are not viable and need further government
support to be attractive to investors. The government can improve the profitability of
the initial pool of projects by designing selection rules and providing direct and indirect
support. Examples of direct support are grants, equity participation and subordinated
loans. Indirect support includes favorable price regulation and various guarantees. When
the government has a high cost of public funding and cannot pay the costs of project
support, revenues from awarding production rights on high return projects can be used as
a source of funding on the low return projects. For example, the government can auction
the exclusive rights to develop a telecommunication network in a profitable metropolitan
area and use the raised funds to support the universal service obligations in rural areas.
In practice, infrastructure builders and operators have superior knowledge about the
commercial value of a project. Consequently, they will have incentives to understate that
value in order to qualify for government support. To solve the adverse selection problem,
the government must decrease its likelihood of approving projects that require some kind
of support. An interesting feature of this problem is the interaction between the minimum
subsidy necessary to implement a low return infrastructure project, the share of approved
low return projects, and the information that investors learn through the award procedure.
I derive the optimal government policy in a two stage model that reflects the investment
promotion stage and the financing stage of the infrastructure project implementation. In
the first stage, the government designs a policy that screens potential projects on the
basis of project returns. The government has two policy instruments, the probability to
approve the project, and the transfer. Each approved project is assigned a transfer that
can be either the payment by the operator for production rights or the support subsidy.
At the second stage, the investor observes the mechanism used by the regulator to approve
projects and the transfers. The investor then uses this information to decide the terms of
the financing contract and the size of the infrastructure project.

3

A simple screening mechanism is to impose a tax on high return project operators
and use the revenue to subsidize a share of the low return projects. I show that this
policy is suboptimal. Under this policy, the investor is perfectly informed about the
project’s returns. Complete information at the financing stage introduces a severe adverse
selection problem at the investment promotion stage. The probability of approval of a low
return project has to be substantially reduced to elicit information from the high return
operators. In practical terms, operators of both project types request project support.
In response, the government supports a only small number of projects. The result is the
underdeveloped infrastructure.
The first result of this paper is that the optimal investment promotion policy leaves the
investors uncertain about the project type and that a share of high return projects obtain
a positive subsidy from the government. This is achieved by the means of a stochastic
selection mechanism. With positive probability, the high return operator is assigned the
same subsidy as the low return operator. In that case observing a subsidy leaves the
investor uncertain about the project type and allows the operator to gain a positive rent.
This is beneficial for the government because it reduces the cost of eliciting information
about the project type from high return operators and, ultimately, results in a higher
share of successfully implemented low return projects.
The second result is related to the expectations of the investor about the project type.
Under asymmetric information, the investor distorts downwards the amount of financing
oﬀered for the low return project. The distortion is more pronounced the higher the belief
of the investor that the project has high returns. Higher distortion translates into a higher
subsidy that the government has to provide to support the project. I show that the optimal
policy induces the smallest feasible distortion. Instead of increasing the expectations of
the investor about the return of the pool of subsidized projects, the optimal policy keeps
the expectation at the original level and provides the subsidy suﬃcient to make low return
projects viable.
The last result deals with the feasibility and desirability of the promotion of low re-
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turn projects. I show that there are two possible policy regimes. Under the first regime,
the government policy promotes only high commercial value projects. This policy gains
positive revenue for the government but results in low level of infrastructure development. Under the second regime, the focus of the policy is the promotion of low return
projects. The government gains no revenue as all payments received from high return
project operators are used to support low return projects. However, this policy enables
the construction of more socially valuable infrastructure. The optimal choice between the
two regimes depends on the preferences of the government and the distribution of projects
in the economy. Surprisingly, as the number of high return projects and the profitability
of these projects increase, the information costs of investment promotion become more
pronounced and less low return projects built.
The policy implication of the theoretical analysis is that an investment promotion
policy should not try to screen operators to identify the profitability of the projects and
communicate this information to potential investors. Rather, the information content
of the policy does not change investor’s expectation about the project returns. At the
same time, the government should design a scheme of financial support that makes low
return projects financially viable and precludes investors from cherry picking high return
projects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I review the relevant
literature. Section 3 presents the model and analyzes the full information benchmark.
Section 4 derives the optimal financing contract for a given level of beliefs of the investor
about the profitability of the project. Section 5 characterizes the optimal investment
promotion policy and derives the main results of the paper. Section 7 discusses the policy
implications and the conclusion follows. All proofs are in the Appendix.

2

Relationship to the literature

This paper contributes to the literature on infrastructure financing and sequential mechanisms. Several recent studies have discussed the challenges of financing infrastructure in
5

developing countries3 . Laﬀont and Martimort (2005) analyze the design of incentives for
provision of transnational public goods when the infrastructure project cannot be funded
by a single country. They study how the external constraints imposed by the mechanism
aﬀect consumption, pricing and redistributive concerns of local governments. In a series
of studies, Guasch, Laﬀont and Straub (2006, 2007, 2008) analyze the incidence of high
frequency renegotiations of infrastructure concession contracts in developing countries.
Rioja (2003) considers the issues of maintaining existing public infrastructure and shows
that a balanced allocation between new investment and maintenance has positive eﬀects
on GDP for a sample of Latin American countries.
There are several studies on the political economy of foreign direct investment that analyze the eﬀect of government preferences between revenue generation and infrastructure
development on the optimal policy. Thomas and Worrall (1994) study the conflict between
the short-term incentive of a developing country to expropriate foreign direct investment
and long-term incentives to foster good relations with potential investors to attract more
investment in the future. Justman (1995) models the link between investment in directly
productive activities and establishing indivisible infrastructure. Investment in infrastructure can increase productivity, but a minimal level of productive activity is needed to
justify it. The paper shows that the eﬃcient level of infrastructure cannot be provided
without ex-ante commitment to fair regulation of infrastructure fees. These studies are
consistent with the results of this paper that the preferences of the government have a
significant eﬀect on the inflow of foreign investments.
This paper develops a sequential common agency model4 . The government and the
investor contract with a common agent, an operator. The investment promotion policy
of the government imposes two types of externalities on the financing contract. First,
it changes the set of feasible contracts by selecting the pool of approved projects and
assigning a transfer to the project operator. Second, it aﬀects the information of the
3

Funding and managing infrastructure in developed countries is also challenging. See Bennett, Iossa
(2006), Caillaud, Tirole (2004) and Martimort, Pouyet (2008) for discussion.
4
See e.g. Baron (1985), Bergman and Välimäki (1998), Martimort (1999), Calzolari and Pavan (2006).
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investor about the project type. I apply the results of Kartasheva (2011) and characterize
the optimal mechanism without imposing restrictions on contracts that can be signed
between the parties. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that designs an
optimal mechanism for investment promotion policies.
There is a number of empirical studies that document the importance of infrastructure
for growth and the corresponding role of government policies. For example, Röller and
Waverman (2001) analyze how telecommunication infrastructure aﬀects economic growth.
They find evidence of a significant positive causal link, especially when a critical mass
of telecommunications infrastructure is present. Several other studies document the importance of information for investment promotion. Kinoshita and Mody (2001) provide
empirical evidence that a Japanese firm’s investment in an emerging market is positively
correlated with its own previous investment in that market and also with the current
investment by its competitors. It appears to reflect the value of private information for
investment in the emerging economy. Morisset (2003) analyzes the eﬀectiveness of investment promotion agencies in 58 countries and finds that policy advocacy, image -building
and investor servicing to be most eﬀective.

3

The Model

3.1

Preferences and technology

A government agency such as a ministry or a local authority aims to develop infrastructure.
There is a pool of potential infrastructure projects in the country. Each project requires a
large scale investment and is built by a private operator. The government and the operator
are financially constrained and need to raise external funds to implement the project. A
third party investor can supply funds to finance projects. The scope of the investment
promotion policy comes from the fact that only a fraction of projects is financially viable.
There are two types of projects5 , a high return type  and a low return type .
The project operator is privately informed about the type. The distribution ( 1 − )
5

In Section 6 I discuss how the results depend on the two types assumption.
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of projects ( ) is common knowledge. I assume that the country has a continuum of
projects with mass one available to implement. Each potential project type  ∈ { } is
associated with one project operator.
The project type  of size  has return   (), where   ()    (). The profit
function   () is increasing, concave and satisfies the Inada conditions ( 0  0,  00  0,
 0 (0) = +∞,  0 (+∞) = 0). We assume that a high return project has higher marginal
profit,  0 ()   0 (), and its marginal profit decreases slower,  00 ()  00 (), than that
of a low return project.
Building infrastructure of size  has fixed cost   0 and variable cost . The financing
contract between the operator and the investor is a debt contract. The investor provides
funds  +  for reimbursement of . The profit of the investor under this contract is
 =  − ( +  )
where  is the cost of capital. The profit of the operator type  net of financing cost is
  () − 
I assume that an investor has all the bargaining power and oﬀers a contract to the operator.
This assumption is consistent with practice where investors are scares and highly involved
in project development. In Section 6 I discuss how a competitive supply of capital aﬀects
the structure of the optimal policy.
Under complete information, the first-best financing scheme maximizes the joint surplus of the operator and the investor. The eﬃcient project size ∗ is defined by  0 (∗ ) = .
The project is financed if it yields non-negative net present value Π∗ , where
Π∗ =   (∗ ) − (∗ +  )
In the analysis of the model, I make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The net present value of a high return project is positive, Π∗  0.
Assumption 2. The net present value of the low return project is negative, Π∗  0.
8

Assumption 2 implies that low return infrastructure projects cannot be built without
eﬀective investment promotion policy. At the same time, Assumption 1 states that high
return projects are commercially viable and do not require government involvement to
raise financing.
The government has two, to a certain extent, conflicting objectives. It maximizes the
social surplus () created by infrastructure of size . Also, it values the revenue collected
from the operator. The social surplus function is increasing, convex and satisfies the Inada
conditions ( 0  0  00  0,  0 (0) = +∞,  0 (+∞) = 0).
The policy instruments of the government are the probability  to approve the project
and the transfer . A positive transfer   0 means that the operator must pay the
government in order to be approved. A negative transfer   0 means that the operator
obtains a subsidy from the government for building the project. The transfer  can be
interpreted either as a tax (subsidy), or the net eﬀect of the distortion due to price
regulation of infrastructure use. Both types of intervention are common in developing
countries. Examples of positive transfers include the payment from the private operator
to the government for a concession contract award, the investment obligations of the
contract or the price caps on infrastructure services. Negative transfers are diﬀerent forms
of government support that range from direct expenditures to various types of guarantees.
The payoﬀ of the government under policy ( ) resulting in infrastructure of size  is
 = [() + ]
These preferences allow for the possibility that that the social value of infrastructure
development () can be low and the government is tilted towards generating the revenue
.
The government does not have external resources to support infrastructure development, and the policy has to satisfy the balanced budget condition. The formal definition
of the constraint is postponed till Section 3.3.
Investment promotion results in the pool of approved projects and the transfers that
each operator of the pool is to pay to or receive from the government. The policy leads
9

to investor’s beliefs  about the share of high return projects in the approved pool. If the
beliefs and the transfer  are suﬃciently high to make financing profitable, the investor
oﬀers a financing contract to the operator. The net profit of the operator approved under
the government policy is
 =   () −  − 
If the operator is not approved, his payoﬀ is normalized to zero.

3.2

Timing and equilibrium

The timing of the game is as follows. First, the operators learn the project type  ∈ { }.
Second, the government designs the investment promotion policy. Projects are approved
according to the policy, and investors observe the policy and the outcome ( ). Third,
the investor oﬀers a financing contract (  +  ). Lastly, if the operator succeeds in
obtaining financing, the operator implements the project and makes payments  and .
In the following I will examine the Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game.

3.3

Mechanism for investment promotion

The investment promotion policy is a direct communication mechanism  between the
government and the operator. The mechanism is composed of the message space  and a
decision function (() ()). Once an operator sends a message  ∈ , it is approved
with probability () Conditional on the approval, the government assigns a lottery ()
which determines the transfer,  ∈ ∆(R).

The Revelation Principle6 applies in this game, and it is without loss of generality

to study the optimal investment promotion policy within the class of direct mechanisms
where the operator reports honestly his type  ∈ { } to the government, and the
government takes the decision (() ()).
In Kartasheva (2011) I show that the size of the support of the optimal lottery  does
not exceed the size of the type space. The next lemma summarizes the application of this
6

See Gibbard (1973), Green and Laﬀont (1977), Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin (1979), Myerson (1979).
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result to the optimal mechanism .
Lemma 1 The lottery  can be characterized with two transfers  and  . Once the
operator reports  to the government, the lottery () assigns a transfer  with probability
  and a transfer  with probability 1 −   , for   ∈ { },  6= .
To fix ideas, I assume that   0 and   0. Since the lottery structure imposes no
restrictions on probabilities   and   , this assumption is without loss of generality.
Lemma 1 enables the characterization of the budget constraint of the government.
The mechanism  satisfies the balanced budget constraint when the subsidy costs are
covered by taxes,
[   + (1 − ) (1 −   )] + [ (1 −   ) + (1 − )   ] ≥ 0

(1)

The investor observes the investment promotion policy of the government  (the
mechanism) and the outcome of the policy. The investors’ belief  ,  =   that an
approved project with transfer  has high return  is
 =

3.4

  
 (1 −   )
and  =

   + (1 − ) (1 −   )
 (1 −   ) + (1 − )  

Full information benchmark

To illustrate the government policy trade-oﬀs and the role of asymmetric information,
consider a situation where the government and the investor can perfectly observe the
project type. The net payoﬀ of project  is Π −  , where
Π =   () − ( +  )
Assumption 2 implies that the  project is financed only when it receives government
support,   0
Assuming that the investor and the operator agree to undertake the project, the
financing contract solves
max  − ( +  )
()

   () −  −  ≥ 0
11

Under this contract, the investor provides the first best amount of financing ∗ , requires
a reimbursement  =   (∗ ) −  and obtains net profit Π∗ −  .
The participation constraint of the investor and the balanced budget constraint of the
government determine the set of transfers that make financing feasible,
 ≤ Π∗ 

(2)

− ≥ −Π∗ 

(3)

  + (1 − )  ≥ 0

(4)

The optimal investment promotion policy maximizes the payoﬀ of the government
∗
) +  ] + (1 − ) [(∗ ) +  ]
max  [(
()

subject to (2), (3) and (4). In this program, the government faces the trade-oﬀ between
∗
maximizing the expected social surplus of infrastructure development  (
) + (1 −

) (∗ ) and the expected revenue   + (1 − )   The net eﬀect of developing a
low return project under full information,
  ≡ (1 − )((∗ ) + Π∗ )
is a sum of the social gain due to infrastructure development (∗ ) and the monetary
cost of subsidizing the project Π∗ . The sign of   determines the investment promotion
policy.
Proposition 1 Under full information, the optimal investment promotion policy has two
possible regimes. Under Regime I, the net eﬀect of developing low return projects is negative,    0. The government approves only high return projects,  = 1 and  = 0
and imposes a tax  = Π∗ . The policy yields positive revenue Π∗ and the government’s
payoﬀ
∗
  = [(
) + Π∗ ]

Under Regime II, the net eﬀect of developing low return projects is positive,    0. The
government approves all high return projects,  = 1 and a share of low return projects,
12

 =

Π∗

1− (−Π∗ )

 1. It imposes a tax on high return projects,  = Π∗  and pays a subsidy

to support low return projects,  = Π∗ . The government gains no revenue and obtains
the payoﬀ

∗
= [(
)+


Π∗
(∗ )]
∗
(−Π )

The government’s optimal policy is Regime II rather than Regime I when infrastructure
has higher social gain  and the cost of developing low return projects −Π∗ is lower.
Are either of the optimal policies feasible under asymmetric information? Asymmetric
information imposes no further costs for the implementation of Regime I. High return
project operators need to reveal the type to be approved by the government. Low return
project payoﬀ is below the tax value. Thus honest reporting is a dominant strategy for
both types of operators.
Regime II is infeasible under asymmetric information. Indeed, consider the ex-ante
payoﬀ of the operator under investment promotion policy ,
  =  (  (∗ ) − ∗ −  )
Under asymmetric information, the type  operator has incentives to misreport its type.
This enables it to benefit from the subsidy allocated to low return projects and gain the
expected profit equal to
 (  (∗ ) − ∗ −  ) =  (  (∗ ) −  (∗ ))  0
The deviation by all high return operators breaks the balanced budget condition. The
government collects no revenue and is unable to subsidize low return projects.
The rest of the paper studies optimal government policy under asymmetric information. The game is solved by backward induction. The next section describes the optimal
financing scheme. Section 5 derives the optimal investment promotion policy and analyzes
the information that the policy reveals to investors.
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4

Financing Contract

Given the investment promotion policy , the investor observes the transfer  and holds
beliefs  that the project has high returns. If beliefs are such that the investor is perfectly
informed about the project type,  ∈ {0 1}, the financing contract is a full information
contract. Under asymmetric information,  ∈ (0 1), the investor oﬀers a menu of two
incentive compatible contracts, (   ) and (   ), and the operator type  selects a
contract (   ).
The optimal financing contract maximizes the investor’s expected payoﬀ,
max ( − ( +  )) + (1 − )( − ( +  ))

(5)

()

subject to the operator’s incentive and the participation constraints for   ∈ { }
  ( ) −  ≥   ( ) −  

(6)

  ( ) −  −  ≥ 0

(7)

Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information, the optimal financing contract entails
∗
the first best financing of the high return project,  = 
, and a downward distortion of

the low return project financing  () implicitly defined by
 0 ( ) =  +


(0 ( ) −  0 ( ))
1− 

The distortion is more pronounced when the beliefs of the investor are higher:

(8)



 0.

The net payoﬀ of the high return project operator, Φ () =   ( ()) −   ( ()), is
positive and is decreasing in the beliefs:

Φ


 0. The net payoﬀ of the low return project

operator is zero.
Under asymmetric information, the cost of financing  project increases due to information rent paid to type  operator. To limit the rent of  type, the investor reduces
financing to the  type operator until the marginal product of capital is equal to the
marginal cost  plus the cost of information rent.
14

The investor participates in financing the two types of projects when both projects
have a non-negative net return. The high return project gains net return Π∗ and is
financed when
Π∗ −  ≥ 0.
The return of the low return project depends on the beliefs of the investor  Π () =
  ( ()) − ( () +  ), and

Π ()


 0. It is financed when

Π () −  ≥ 0
Higher beliefs  make the distortion of the  project type more pronounced. This distortion is costly for the government. Were both project types profitable, the government
would have chosen a passive policy resulting in the lowest beliefs  = . Thus screening
out a share of unprofitable  type projects has two eﬀects on the financing. It translates
into higher beliefs    and reduces the size of  type projects, making them even less
profitable. At the same time, it reduces the number of subsidized projects, and increases
the government’s revenue. The government’s policy trades-oﬀ the two eﬀects.

5

Investment Promotion Policy

The investor’s information includes the mechanism , the approval decision and the
transfer. From Lemma 1, the optimal investment policy consists of a menu of two contracts
that specify for each type  a probability of approval  and a lottery    The support of
the lottery is two transfers  and  that lead to beliefs
 =

  
 (1 −   )

and  =
   + (1 − ) (1 −   )
 (1 −   ) + (1 − )  

The lottery (  )= determines how much information is revealed to the investor.
If a transfer  is assigned to each type  with probability one,   = 1, then, regardless
of the approval policy {   } the investor can perfectly infer the type of project from
observing  . Using a lottery    1 leaves the investor uncertain about the operator’s
type and thus permits  type operator to gain rent at the financing stage (Proposition 2).
15

Hence, it reduces the cost of screening for the government. At the same time, the  type
must be subsidized to realize the project. The government cannot benefit by reducing
the probability that  type obtains the support, and   = 1. The formal proof of these
arguments is presented in the Appendix and summarized in the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 The transfer lottery  of the investment promotion policy has the following
structure. Type  pays a tax  with probability   and receives a subsidy  with probability 1 −   . Type  receives a subsidy  with probability   = 1. Observing transfers
 and  results in beliefs
 = 1 and  =

 (1 −   )

 (1 −   ) + (1 − )

This result can be used to describe the set of constraints faced by the government.
The  type operator earns a positive rent only when it is assigned a subsidy  and the
investor is uncertain about the operator’s type. The incentive constraint states that the
probability of this event is higher when the operator reports honestly to the government,
 (1 −   ) ≥  

(9)

The participation constraints of the investor are
Π∗ −  ≥ 0

(10)

Π ( ) −  ≥ 0

(11)

Compared to the situation of full information, the subsidy − that the regulator commits
to under asymmetric information is higher due to the distortion of the financing contract,
Π ( ) ≤ Π∗ .
Finally, the policy has to satisfy the balanced budget condition,
    + [ (1 −   ) + (1 − ) ] ≥ 0
The objective of the government is to maximize the expected payoﬀ,
∗
max  =  [(
) +    + (1 −   ) ] + (1 − ) [( ( )) +  ]
()

16

(12)

subject to constraints (9), (10), (11) and (12). Decreasing the probability   that type
 pays a tax relaxes the incentive constraint (9). It also reduces the distortion of financing the  type  ( ), increases the type  project payoﬀ Π ( ) and relaxes the
participation constraint of the investor (11). However, decreasing   also implies that
the government has fewer resources to subsidize type  projects. To balance the budget
(12), the government has to reduce the share of approved low return projects  .
In the next proposition I summarize the properties of the optimal investment promotion policy.
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information, the government’s value of developing low
return projects equals
 = (1 − )[( ()) + Π ()] − [Π∗ − Π ()]
The optimal investment promotion policy has two policy regimes. Under Regime I, the net
eﬀect of developing low return projects is negative,   0. Only high return projects
are approved by the government and implemented,  = 1 and  = 0. The government
imposes a tax  = Π∗ on high return operators and gains a positive revenue Π∗ . The
government’s payoﬀ is
∗
 = [(
) + Π∗ ]

Under Regime II, the value of developing low return projects is positive,   0. All
high return projects and a share of low return projects are approved by the government,
Π∗
Π∗ −Π ()
−Π ()
 1 of
Π∗ −Π ()

 = 1 and  =

 1. Low return projects obtain a subsidy  = Π (). A

share   =

high return projects pays a tax  = Π∗ and gains zero net

payoﬀ. A share 1 −   of high return projects receives a subsidy  and gains a positive
net payoﬀ Φ (). The investor’s beliefs depend on the transfer assigned to the approved
firm. A tax  reveals that the project has high returns,  = 1. The subsidy  preserves
the prior beliefs  = . The government’s payoﬀ is

∗

= [(
) +   Π∗ + (1 −   )Π ()] + (1 − ) [( ()) + Π ()]
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High return projects provide the government with the revenue necessary to support
low return projects. Under full information, a tax is imposed on all high return project
operators. This policy becomes infeasible under asymmetric information. Indeed, all high
return project operators would understate the value of their projects and seek government
support.
Incentive compatibility is achieved with two policy instruments. First, with a positive
probability 1−  the high return project operator obtains a subsidy  . Since all approved
low return projects obtain the same subsidy, the investor is uncertain about the type of
the operator who received a subsidy  . This allows the operator to gain the rent Φ ( ).
It also decreases the government’s revenue because only a share of high return projects
pays the tax. Second, the government reduces the probability of approving a low return
project.
The information structure of the optimal policy is such that the investor who observes
the transfer  maintains the prior beliefs  = . This result echoes the discussion of the
optimal financing contract. The investor’s higher belief that the project is high return
exacerbates the downward distortion on low return projects. The distortion is costly
to the government because it increases the subsidy necessary to support the low return
operator. Thus a policy that reduces the investor’s belief also enables a decrease in the
subsidy. However, the binding incentive compatibility constraint implies that  = 1−  ,
and the best policy that can be implemented under this constraint is one which preserves
prior beliefs .
Uncertainty of the investor about the project type reduces the net benefit of promoting
low return projects,     . As a result, a government with asymmetric information
must be more pro-development to implement policy Regime II.
Proposition 4 The government’s optimal policy is Regime II rather than Regime I when
the social value of infrastructure  is higher and low return projects require less support
−Π (). It is Regime I when the projects have higher fixed costs  , the returns of profitable
projects Π∗ are higher and the share of profitable projects in the economy  is higher.
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Perhaps unexpectedly, higher profitability of commercially valuable projects Π∗ and
higher share of these projects in the economy  reduce the likelihood that the government
implements the policy that supports low return projects. This is because the information
cost of promoting low return projects increases when the distribution of project types in
the economy becomes more disperse.

6

Robustness

In this section I discuss how the properties of the investment promotion policy depend on
the distribution of projects in the economy and the monopoly supply of capital.

6.1

More than two types

One interesting feature of the investment promotion policy is that the outcome of the
policy, that is, an approval decision and a transfer, do not perfectly reveal the operator’s
type. The government chooses a policy that leads to partial revelation of types because
it reduces the cost of information rent paid to the operator. In the case of discrete types,
the partial revelation is achieved by assigning a stochastic transfer.7
When the support of operators’ types is a continuum, the structure will be more
complex. Laﬀont and Tirole (1988) analyze a dynamic two period model where an agent
has a continuum of potential abilities and each period a principal oﬀers a short term
contract. They show that the optimal first period contract has a partition structure.
Applied to the game considered in this paper with a continuum of project types, this result
suggests that the policy will have the following structure. The type space is partitioned
in a countable number of intervals and all operators’ types from an interval are assigned
the same transfer. The information eﬀect of the government policy will be similar to the
case of discrete types. Observing the transfer will not perfectly reveal the operator’s type.
7

In Kartasheva (2009) I consider a general case of a finite type space and show that an optimal decision
is a lottery with the dimension of the support not exceeding the dimension of the type space.
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6.2

Competitive supply of capital

One of the main assumptions of the analysis is that the investor is a monopoly supply of
capital. Then an interesting question is whether competition among investors eliminates
the need for investment promotion and leads to eﬃcient financing of both project types.
In this section I show that though competitive supply of capital improves welfare and
promotes infrastructure development, it does not eliminate the need for the investment
promotion policy.
I model competition in financing contracts in line with Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976) freeentry equilibrium. A large number of investors oﬀer contracts ( ) to approved project
operators that were assigned a transfer . An equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A pair of contracts  = (   ) and  = (   ) is a free entry
equilibrium if and only if it is
(i) incentive compatible,   ( ) −  ≥   ( ) −    6=    =  ;
(ii) individually rational for project operator,   ( ) −  −  ≥ 0  =  ;
(iii) individually rational for investors,  − ( +  ) ≥ 0  =  ;
(iv) satisfies free entry condition, namely, there is no contract  = (   ) that can
be introduced faced to  and  and gain a positive market share,
- if   ( ) −  ≥ 0 for some  =  , then  − ( +  )  0;
- if  − ( +  ) ≥ 0, then   ( ) −   0 for all  =  
An important distinction of a competitive financial market from the monopoly supply
of capital is that the project operator receives all the surplus generated by the project
net of the transfer. Consequently, an operator prefers contracts that maximize the NPV
of the project. As a result, competition solves the adverse selection problem and results
in eﬃcient financing.
Proposition 5 Eﬃcient contracts ∗ = (∗  ∗ ), where  0 (∗ ) =  and ∗ = (∗ +  ),
constitute a free entry equilibrium at the financing stage.
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This result implies that the investment promotion policy of the government does not
impose an information externality on the financing contract. At the same time, due
to Assumption 2, low return operators need government support in order to be willing
to borrow in a competitive market. Hence the optimal investment promotion policy
maximizes the expected social welfare,
∗
max  =  [(
) +  ] + (1 − ) [(∗ ) +  ]
()

subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints of operators, and the
balanced budget constraint,   =  

 


 [Π∗ −  ] ≥  [Π∗ −  ]
 [Π∗ −  ] ≥ 0
  + (1 − )  ≥ 0

Proposition 6 Under competitive supply of capital, the government’s value of developing
low return projects equals
 = (1 − )((∗ ) + Π∗ ) − (Π∗ − Π∗ )
The optimal investment promotion policy has two policy regimes. Under Regime I, the net
eﬀect of developing low return projects is negative,   0. The government approves
only high return operators,  = 1, imposes a tax  = Π∗ , and gains welfare
∗
 = [(
) + Π∗ ]

Under Regime II, the value of developing low return projects is positive,   0.
The government approves all high return operators,  = 1 and imposes a tax  =
−

(1−)Π∗ Π∗
Π∗ −Π∗

 0; it approves a share of low return operators,  =

provides support  = Π∗  0. The government gains welfare

∗

= [(
)+

Π∗
Π∗ −Π∗

 1 and

(1 − )Π∗
(∗ )]
Π∗ − Π∗

Compared to the case of monopoly supply of capital, competition increases probability
of approval of low return operators, the net value of developing low return projects, and
the welfare.
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The structure of the investment promotion policy is similar to the policy obtained under monopoly supply of capital. All  type operators are approved and have to pay the
tax in order to finance the support of  type operators. The diﬀerence is that competition
increases the net eﬀect of developing low return projects by eliminating the distortion of
the financing contract. As a result, it increases the expected welfare of the government
and the net profit of the high return operators. These results imply that financial development fosters infrastructure financing but does not eliminate the need for the investment
promotion policy.

7

Policy Implications and Discussion

The analysis has several policy implications. The optimal policy does not induce full disclosure of information about project profitability. By limiting the information available
to the investor, the government can increase the pool of projects that succeed and attract financing. This conclusion is consistent with the experience of developing countries
in designing investment promotion policies. In a comprehensive survey of government
investment promotion agencies in a wide sample of countries, Wells and Wint (2000)
conclude that agencies focusing on providing a platform for information exchange about
opportunities in the country and coordinating among diﬀerent branches of the government are more successful in attracting investments. Investors need to be provided with
information that allows them to make consistent entry decisions. At the same time, the
investment policy should not be involved with project specific decisions.
The set of feasible policies and the choice of the policy is determined by the preferences
of the government. A government with strong preferences for infrastructure development
designs a policy that focuses on coordination of information and support functions. However, this policy does not raise revenue. On the contrary, emphasis on revenue creation
leads to a policy which promotes exclusively high profitability projects and is informative
about project characteristics.
The feasibility of the policy depends on the distribution of potential projects in the
22

country. If the share of highly profitable projects is low, promotion of these projects is the
only feasible policy. One implication of this result is that infrastructure development in
this case cannot be achieved by relying entirely on the private sector. It is consistent with
recent observations by policy makers (Estache (2004)) that though there was rebalancing
from public to private financing in the infrastructure in developing countries during the
1990s, its geographic and sector distribution was very uneven. The lowest income countries
and poorest regions in middle-income countries still have to rely on public financing.

8

Conclusion

The paper analyzes the optimal design of investment promotion policies. The main conclusion of the paper is that investment promotion policy must balance the benefits of
better information about the potential profitability of projects and the cost of excluding
low return projects. The optimal mechanism that describes the pool of projects approved
by the government, the information revealed to potential investors and the structure of
the government support. I show that a government which focuses on revenue generation
will select a full revelation policy, separating high and low return projects. The policy results in excluding low return projects from financing. At the same time, the government
that focuses on infrastructure development will reduce the information revealed to the
investors in order to maximize the amount of projects that obtain financing. However,
the ability to implement this policy depends on the initial profitability of investing in the
country. If it is low, promoting high return projects may be the only feasible policy, and
external support, like oﬃcial assistance, is needed for infrastructure development.
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Appendix: Proofs
The optimal investment promotion policy under full infor-

Proof of Proposition 1.
mation solves

∗
max   =  [(
) +  ] + (1 − ) [(∗ ) +  ]
()

 
Π∗ −  ≥ 0
Π∗ −  ≥ 0
  + (1 − )  ≥ 0
Denote by   0,   0 and   0 the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints. The
first order conditions of the program are
 :
 :
 :
 :

∗
(
) +   0
(1 − )(∗ ) + (1 − ) = 0
 −  +  = 0
(1 − ) −  + (1 − ) = 0

The left hand side of the first order condition with respect to  is positive, implying that
the government cannot gain by excluding  type projects,  = 1. First order conditions
with respect to  and  imply that  =  (1 + ) and  = (1 − ) (1 + ). Thus
if   0 then   0,  =  .
Regime I.   0,  = 0. Then  = 0,  = Π∗ ,  = 0 and  = 0 The
government’s expected payoﬀ is equal to
∗
) + Π∗ )
 = ((

Regime II.   0,  =  . Then  = Π∗ ,  = Π∗  If   0, then  =
1 and  =

∗)
(
(−Π∗ )

Π∗

1− (−Π∗ )



 0. The government expected’s payoﬀ is equal to
 =

∗
((
)

Π∗
+
(∗ ))
∗
(−Π )

If  = 0, then  = 1 and the budget constraint fails.
Regime I is optimal when    , or   = (1 − )((∗ ) + Π∗ )  0. Otherwise,
Regime II is optimal.
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Proof of Proposition 2.

Assuming that constraints  and   are binding, the

reimbursement schedule writes
 =   ( ) − [  ( ) −  ( )] − 

(13)

 =   ( ) − 

(14)

The investor’s problem reduces to
max (  ( ) −  − [  ( ) −   ( )]) + (1 − )(  ( ) −  ) − 


The optimal financing scheme is
0 ( ) = 
 0 ( ) =  +

(15)

[0 ( ) −  0 ( )]
1− 

(16)

It is straightforward to verify that the neglected  and   are satisfied. If the solution
to (16) is negative, then  =  = 0 The operator’s rent is Φ =   ( ) −  ( ) and
Φ = 0
Assumption 00 ()   00 () implies that the distortion of the low return project size
is increasing in beliefs,
 0 ( ) −  0 ( )

1
=
 0


(1 − )2  00 ( ) − 1−
[ 00 ( ) −  00 ( )]

 0
The rent Φ () is decreasing in beliefs  Φ0 () = [ 0 ( ) −  0 ( )] 


Proof of Lemma 2. The optimal investment promotion policy of the government must
satisfy the following set of constraints. The incentive compatibility constraints of the
operator are
 [  Φ ( ) + (1 −   )Φ ( )] ≥  [  Φ ( ) + (1 −   )Φ ( )]

(17)

 [  Φ ( ) + (1 −   )Φ ( )] ≥  [  Φ ( ) + (1 −   )Φ ( )]

(18)
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The participation constraints of the investor are
  (Π∗ −  ) ≥ 0

(19)

(1 −  )(Π∗ −  ) ≥ 0

(20)

  (Π ( ) −  ) ≥ 0

(21)

(1 −   )(Π ( ) −  ) ≥ 0

(22)

These constraints state that whenever an operator type  is assigned the transfer  with a
positive probability,   ∈ { }, the payoﬀ of the project of type  must be non-negative.
The budget constraint of the government is
[   + (1 − ) (1 −   )] + [ (1 −   ) + (1 − )   ] ≥ 0

(23)

The optimal government policy maximizes the expected payoﬀ
∗
) +    + (1 −   ) ]
max  =  [(
()

+(1 − ) [  (( ( )) +  ) + (1 −   )(( ( )) +  )]
subject to constraints (17)-(23).
There are three possible lottery structures: (a) double randomization,   ∈ (0 1),
 =  ; (b) randomization of  type,   ∈ (0 1) and   ∈ {0 1}; (c) randomization
of  type,   ∈ {0 1} and   ∈ (0 1).
Under randomization of the  type in (a) and (c), constraints (21), (22) and Π ( ) 
0,  =   imply that   0 and   0, and thus the budget constraint (23) cannot be
satisfied. Hence, randomization of the  type is not feasible, and the only possible lottery
structure is (b).
Suppose that type  is assigned a transfer  with probability one,   = 0. Then
either   0 and (23) fails, or   0 and the lottery fails to satisfy (22). Hence,   = 0
is not feasible.
The only feasible randomization structure is (b) with   = 1. Under this structure
 = 1 and  =

 (1− )
.
 (1−  )+(1−)

These beliefs produce the operator rent profile

∗
∗
Φ ( ) =   (
) −  (
)  0
Φ ( ) = 0
Φ ( ) =   ( ( )) −   ( ( ))  0 Φ ( ) = 0
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This profile simplifies the incentive constraints to
 (1 −   ) ≥  
0 ≥    Φ ( )
which implies that the incentive constraint of the  type always holds. The participation
constraints of the investor and the budget constraint of the government become
 (1 −  ) ≥  
Π∗ −  ≥ 0
Π ( ) −  ≥ 0
    + [ (1 −   ) + (1 − ) ] ≥ 0
These imply that a feasible policy must have   0 and   0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the lottery described in Lemma 2, the optimal investment promotion policy solves the problem
max =
()

∗
 [(
) + (   + (1 −   ) )]

+(1 − ) [( ( )) +  ]
 
 (1 −   ) ≥  
Π∗ −  ≥ 0
Π ( ) −  ≥ 0
    + [ (1 −   ) + (1 − ) ] ≥ 0
Denote by   0   0,   0 and   0 the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints.
The first order conditions of the optimal policy are
 :
 :
 :
 :

 ( ) 
∗
 )) 
 (
) + (1 − ) ( (
+  (1 −   ) +  Π
+   0




Π ( ) 
( ( )) 
(1 − )(( ( )) +    ) −  +    + (1 − ) = 0
   −  +    = 0
 (1 −   ) + (1 − ) −  + ( (1 −   ) + (1 − ) ) = 0

The left hand side of the first order condition with respect to  is always positive,
implying  = 1 Conditions with respect to  and  and  = 1 imply that  =
   (1 + )  0 and  = ( (1 −   ) + (1 − ) )(1 + )  0. Hence  = Π∗
and  = Π ( ). Finally, the condition with respect to  implies that   0 and the
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incentive constraint is binding. The investor’s beliefs under this policy are  = 1 and
 =

 (1− )
 (1− )+(1−)

= , that is, the investor observing  maintains prior beliefs .

Regime I. If  = 0, then  = 0   = 1 and  = 0. The government obtains the
payoﬀ
∗
 = [(
) + Π∗ ]

Under Regime I, the payoﬀ of the government under asymmetric information equals the
payoﬀ under full information,  =   .
Regime II. If   0, then  and   are determined by the incentive constraint of the
 type and the budget constraint,
 = 1 −   
 Π∗ + [(1 −   ) + (1 − ) ]Π () = 0
Solving for  and   , we obtain

 =

Π∗
∗
Π −Π ()

 1 and  
 =

−Π ()
Π∗ −Π ()

 1

The share of approved  types under asymmetric information is lower than the share



∗
under complete information, 
   . Indeed,    is equivalent to Π + (1 −

)Π∗ − Π () = [Π∗ − Π ()] + (1 − )[Π∗ − Π ()]  0. The last inequality holds
because Π∗  Π () and Π∗  Π () The government’s expected payoﬀ equals


∗
 ∗

= [(
) + (1 − )

 ( ())] +   Π + [(1 −   ) + (1 − )]Π ()

Regime II is optimal if and only if 
   or equivalently,

 = ( ()) + Π () −


[Π∗ − Π ()]  0
1− 

Compared to optimal policy under complete information, the government which implements Regime II must be more pro-development, that is, it has to have higher value .
Proof of Proposition 4. Diﬀerentiation of  with respect to ,  , Π∗ and −Π ()
immediately obtains the results.
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Proof of Proposition 5. In a separating equilibrium, the two contracts (   ) and
(   ) maximize the payoﬀ of types  and , respectively,
  ( ) −  − 
subject to incentive constraint (6) and participation constraint (7) of the operator, and
the participation constraint of the investors for each type of contract,
 − ( +  ) ≥ 0
It is immediate to verify that the eﬃcient contracts (∗  ∗ ), where ∗ = (∗ +  ) are
incentive compatible. Indeed, constraint (6) is satisfied because ∗ = arg max ( ) −


( +  ). Thus, as long as the transfer is suﬃciently high to satisfy (7) of the low return
project , both operators build eﬃcient level of infrastructure. There exists no pooling
equilibrium. Indeed, any pooling contract can be crowd out of the market by an eﬃcient
separating contract.
Proof of Proposition 6.

Type  has incentives to misreport the type to the gov-

ernment in order to obtain a subsidy intended for type . The government provides
incentives to  type by reducing the probability of approval of the  type. To find an
optimal policy, I assume that constraints  ,   are binding, and verify the other
constraints ex-post. The assumption implies
 = Π∗  0
 ∗
(Π − Π∗ )  0
 = Π∗ −
 
The an optimal approval policy (   ) maximizes
∗
 =  [(
) + Π∗ ] +  [(1 − )((∗ ) + Π∗ ) − (Π∗ − Π∗ )]

subject to the binding  constraint,
 Π∗ −  [(Π∗ − Π∗ ) − (1 − )Π∗ ] ≥ 0
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It is immediate to show that  = 1. The probability of approval of low return projects
depends on the sign of the net eﬀect of developing these projects,
 = (1 − )((∗ ) + Π∗ ) − (Π∗ − Π∗ )
where the first term is the net welfare gain/loss of low return projects and the second
term is the cost of information rent that has to be paid to the high return operators to
implement the policy.
If   0 , then
 = 0
 = 0
 = Π∗ 
The policy obtains expected social welfare
∗
 = [(
) + Π∗ ]

If   0 then the government policy is
Π∗
 1
Π∗ − Π∗
= Π∗  0
(1 − )Π∗ Π∗
= −
 0
Π∗ − Π∗

 =



The government provides support for a share   1 of low return projects, and requires
a payment for production rights from high return operators. In contrast to the case of a
monopoly investor, the high return operator obtains a positive profit. The policy results
in the expected social welfare

∗

= [(
)+

(1 − )Π∗
(∗ )]
Π∗ − Π∗

Immediate comparison between the policy characteristics under monopoly and competition obtains that competition increases , ,  .
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